Research

Published Research

“Working Hand in Hand: Interest Groups and Cooperative Dynamics in Campaigns“ – The Journal of Politics

Available here: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/737690

SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5361792

Abstract:

Prior research on party-interest group and candidate-interest group dynamics
highlights cooperative exchange, whereby resource-rich interest groups provide financial or logistical support to resource-constrained candidates and parties—frequently in implicit exchange for legislative influence. This paper introduces a new dimension to these cooperative dynamics, demonstrating how parties and candidates subsidize and shape interest group spending on elections using a strategy known as “redboxing.” Drawing on the first comprehensive dataset of instances of redboxing, I show that this strategy was used more than 800 times in 331 U.S. House and Senate races from 2018-2022. Computational text analysis further reveals that the major parties
and their affiliated candidates employed redboxing to shape the content of almost $170 million in “independent” interest group ad spending during the 2020 cycle alone. These findings underline the collaborative nature of modern campaigns, with parties and candidates routinely exploiting loopholes in election law to coordinate with outside allies.

“Candidate B-Roll as Super PAC Subsidy” – American Politics Research

Available here: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1532673X251344203

SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5270902

Abstract:

Prior research theorizes that recent growth in outside election spending has undermined candidates’ ability to control the information received by voters. This paper explores how candidates have adapted to retain control over their visual presentation to voters in the face of competition with wealthy outside interests. Drawing on a new dataset of B-Roll and image provision, I show that this strategy was employed by candidates more than 650 times in 390 U.S. House and Senate races from 2018-2022. I further argue that these visual resources served as a novel form of subsidy for allied super PACs, lowering the cost of production for outside ads and encouraging outside involvement in congressional races. By matching candidate-provided visual resources to a dataset of 7,881 political ads, I show that more than $116.5 million of “independent” outside advertising was subsidized through candidate B-Roll and image provision during the 2018 and 2020 cycles alone. This research indicates that candidates continue to prioritize – and wield significant control over – their visual presentation in political advertising despite regulatory and financial disadvantages.

“Coordination in Plain Sight: The Breadth and Uses of ‘Redboxing’ in Congressional Elections” (co-authored with Saurav Ghosh, Campaign Legal Center) – Election Law Journal

Available here: https://www.liebertpub.com/action/ssostart?redirectUri=%2Fdoi%2Fepub%2F10.1089%2Felj.2023.0038

SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4768176

Abstract: This article examines the campaign strategy known as “redboxing”. Redboxing refers to efforts by candidates and parties to bypass laws prohibiting them from coordinating campaign advertising with outside spending groups such as super PACs. This coordination takes place in plain sight – on official campaign websites and party “microsites” – with campaigns asking outside groups to fund specific campaign messages that target particular groups of voters on desired media channels. The instructions contained in a redbox typically employ coded or technical language intended to guide the resulting “independent” expenditures, and are often presented in a distinctive, red-bordered text box designed to be easily identifiable by super PAC operatives. Overall, we find that campaigns use redboxing for two purposes: to engage an allied outside group to amplify the campaign’s primary message to voters, or to delegate a given message to an allied group, often a negative or inflammatory attack on a political opponent. Complementing our legal analysis of this practice, we assess the prevalence of redboxing in the American political system, as well as the relationship between redboxing and independent expenditures in congressional races. Drawing on the first comprehensive dataset of redboxes in a single electoral cycle, we find that this strategy is far more widespread than previously understood. Over two hundred candidates for federal office employed redboxing during the 2022 electoral cycle, and these same candidates frequently benefitted from super PAC spending that was hundreds of times greater than candidates who did not redbox. We conclude by providing recommendations for legal reforms to bring redboxing under control, highlighting recent reform initiatives adopted in Philadelphia and Allegheny County, PA, to outline a workable rule that prohibits redboxing while not infringing on genuine, vital political speech. 

Book Project

“Law‘s Limits: Why Formal Rules Fail to Govern American Elections“

Abstract:

In this manuscript, I examine the failure of law and the legal system to constrain political behavior in an electoral setting. Through analysis of strategic adaptations such as “redboxing” and visual resource provision, the book outlines how candidates and their outside allies comply with the letter of the law while routinely undermining its spirit. These practices expose the weaknesses of formal regulation in an environment characterized by asymmetric resources, weak enforcement, and ongoing strategic innovation. The result is a system in which legal rules shape behavior not by effectively constraining it, but by providing a roadmap for circumvention.

Working Papers

“Copy-Paste Campaigns? Competition, Common Vendors, and Convergence in Electoral Discourse”

Abstract:

Prior research is divided as to whether electoral competition provides incentives for campaign actors to converge to a common set of issues in political communications, or diverge in favor of district-tailored or partisan-specific messaging. We examine this question using a dataset of 22,005 transcripts for political advertisements aired in congressional races from 2012-2020. In brief, we find evidence that electoral competition depresses similarity in campaign discourse both within-race and across-race. Specifically, a race moving from solid to toss-up status was associated with a 3.6% decrease in within-race thematic similarity and a roughly 20% decrease in co-partisan thematic similarity across the races in a given cycle. However, controlling for competition, ads produced by a common political consultant on behalf of a candidate and allied interest group were approximately 30% more similar in strict linguistic terms relative to the baseline than those lacking this connection. These findings indicate that despite incentives for convergence in campaign discourse, candidates facing electoral jeopardy continue to prioritize messaging tailored to their constituency and district.

“Speaking in Sync: Interest Groups and Strategic Advocacy in Congressional Elections” (co-authored with Craig Asberry)

Abstract:

Prior research on interest group behavior in elections has examined whether these groups primarily act as loose cannons, diverging from the preferred issues of their chosen candidate, or loyal foot soldiers, matching allied candidates’ issue focus in their own advertising. To address this question, we leverage the most comprehensive dataset of advertising communications in congressional elections to date – 22,005 TV political ad transcripts for U.S. House and Senate races from 2012-2020. In doing so, we improve upon the research design and measurement strategies used in prior scholarship, permitting observation of how alignment patterns have shifted over time
in response to political and regulatory changes. Ultimately, we identify high levels of strategic alignment between interest group- and candidate-sponsored advertising, suggesting a declining inclination for interest groups to “go their own way” in elections. This research contributes to work on issue convergence in campaigns, as well as broader debates on strategic advocacy by interest groups.

“Breaching the Firewall: Political Consultants and Information Transmission in Campaigns”

Abstract:

Prior research theorizes that political consultants function as “information brokers” in elections, transmitting effective political strategies between co-partisan candidates. In this paper, I examine how consultants can also transfer more specific political intelligence between a campaign and its outside allies by serving as a so-called “common vendor” – simultaneously providing services to both sets of actors. Using an original dataset of almost $8 billion in candidate and outside group expenditures on shared political consultants during congressional and presidential elections from 2012-2022, I establish that spending on common vendors has increased substantially in recent cycles, with the vast majority of such spending being concentrated among a small number of partisan consulting firms. Case studies further highlight instances of consultants transferring valuable political intelligence between campaigns and outside groups despite legal restrictions. These findings underline the porousness of current campaign finance law, with consultants routinely exploiting loopholes to bring candidates and their outside allies into closer strategic alignment.

“Direct Election and Senate Representation” (co-authored with Jon C. Rogowski and Daniel J. Moskowitz)

Abstract:

The Seventeenth Amendment to the US Constitution established the direct election of US Senators, which recognized voters rather than state legislatures as senators’ principals. Theories of electoral accountability suggest that this change would have increased the incentives for senators to pursue vote-seeking behaviors. We test this claim and evaluate how direct
election affected political representation and legislative effort. In so doing, we improve upon the research design and measurement strategies used in previous scholarship while studying a more comprehensive set of indicators of legislative behavior. Our evidence is mixed. While we find no evidence that direct election increased senators’ responsiveness to constituency preferences, our results also indicate that direct election reduced party unity and increased senators’ rates of participation in the legislative process. These results are driven largely, though not exclusively, by replacement rather than adaptation. Our findings provide new evidence about the legislative consequences of the Seventeenth Amendment and the channels through which these changes were produced.

“The Genesis of a Reform Effort: The Political and Institutional Origins of the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress”

Abstract:

Since the early 20th century, efforts to reform the U.S. Congress have sought to remedy institutional weaknesses and bolster legislative branch capacity relative to an ascendant executive. This paper situates the most recent of these efforts – the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress (2019-22) – in the history of congressional reform initiatives, examining the circumstances of its formation as well as the institutional pressures that limited its scope to operational modernization over changes to the leadership or committee systems. Drawing on more than two dozen interviews with current and former members of Congress, staffers, outside experts, and scholars, this paper reconstructs the committee’s origins in longstanding reform debates inWashington, D.C. and traces how a specific moment in political time – the transition of power in the U.S. House of Representatives following the 2018 midterm elections – opened space for this bipartisan initiative. This study illustrates both the persistence of institutional constraints and the possibilities for incremental change through the partnership of internal political entrepreneurs and external reform advocates.

“Pledges and Payoffs: Evidence from NRA Resource Allocation in Congressional Campaigns, 2009-2017” (co-authored with Benjamin Shaver)

Abstract:

Prior research emphasizes the value of interest group endorsements and spending in congressional elections. We examine how candidates solicit these resources using a new dataset of 6,320 vote- and questionnaire-based grades for U.S. House and Senate races from 2009-2017 assembled by the National Rifle Association (NRA). This data shows that candidates making a questionnaire-based policy pledge were substantially more likely to be endorsed, to receive campaign contributions, and to benefit from NRA-sponsored independent expenditures, apart from when competing
against an opponent with a strong vote-based, pro-gun record. These findings illuminate how contemporary interest groups select preferred candidates through a combination of legislative research and “loyalty tests” designed to tie the hands of prospective lawmakers.